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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is two fold. First, we hope that the analysis contained here will provide 
policymakers in Peru with a guidepost to framing appropriate financial and economic policy.  
Second, we hope to offer policymakers everywhere a template to implement a similar type of 
“growth diagnostic” for their respective countries.  In this paper we find that the macro and 
micro-economic milieu in Peru constitutes a binding constraint and relieving this constraint 
would lead to significant economic growth. A recent World Bank study and a World Economic 
Forum survey confirm our general findings. In addition, our analysis indicates the following: Peru 
is not savings or investment constrained in either domestic or international markets; Peru is 
clearly constrained by a lack of “High Quality” human capital; poor infrastructure in Peru 
results in high transportation costs causing an adverse impact on competitiveness. Surprisingly, 
the sophistication of Peru’s exports was not a constraint, and in fact, Peru appeared to do quite 
well in terms of self discovery.   
 
Keywords:  Peru, Growth Diagnostics, Micro-economic Constraints, Macro-Economic Constraints, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), LAC (Latin American and Caribbean) Countries 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he most fundamental question in development economics is the manner in which a country raises the 
standard of living for its citizens. A unified, standardized approach to development has, however, proved 
elusive. Policies and reforms that work well for some economies have proved to be either ineffective or 
even have unintended negative effects on others. A recent paper by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) pioneers 
an innovative approach to “growth diagnostics.” Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco argue that “…trying to come up 
with an identical growth strategy for all countries, regardless of their circumstances, is unlikely to prove productive. 
…..The key step is to develop a better understanding of how the binding constraints on economic activity differ from 
setting to setting……Governments face administrative and political limitations, and their policy making capital is 
better deployed in alleviating binding constraints than in going after too many targets at once” (p.1-2.1). 
 
The objective of this paper is to perform a growth diagnostic for Peru. The methodology is similar to the 
framework proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco. We begin by asking what explains Peru‟s poor economic 
performance and then seeking the underlying causes that explain a particular facet of its performance. These causes 
could be related to low investment which in turn may be explained by factors such as low savings, poor access to 
capital markets, low returns to investment, poor appropriability, inadequate property right protections, etc. We 
provide an exhaustive examination of various developmental bottlenecks and constraints. Specifically, we examine 
savings rates, investment rates, deposit rates, external bond yield spreads, geographical factors, infrastructural 
constraints, human capital constraints, Mincerian rate of return estimates, tax rates, etc.  
 
                                                   
1 See also a subsequent paper on “Getting the Diagnosis Right” by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, Finance and Development, 
Vol.43, No.1, March 2006. 
T 
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Our objective of this paper is twofold. First, we hope that the analysis contained here would provide 
policymakers in Peru with a guidepost to framing appropriate economic policy, and second, we hope to provide 
economic policymakers everywhere with a template to implement a similar type of “growth diagnostic” for their 
own countries.  
 
PERU’S MACROECONOMIC RECORD (1960-2005) 
 
We begin by looking at a few stylized facts about Peru‟s macroeconomic performance. Between the 
periods of 1960-1975, Peru's economic growth was relatively healthy. The average growth rate in real GDP per 
capita for the 5-year sub-periods 1961-65, 1966-70 and 1971-75 was 3.18%, 1.54% and 2.13% (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1:  Growth in Real GDP Per Capita (Peru versus LAC Countries) 
 1961-
1965 
1966-
1970 
1971-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
1961-
2005 
PERU 3.18% 1.54% 2.13% -.39% -1.81% -3.63% 3.67% .76% 2.57% .89% 
LAC 2.29% 2.83% 3.40% 2.92% -1.60% -.15% 1.75% 1.64% .97% 1.56% 
Source:  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
 
Though Peru underperformed LAC (Latin American and Caribbean) countries as a whole, its growth record 
during this period was not unhealthy. Peru's economic problems began in the mid-70s when its growth rate began to 
turn negative. Over the next decade (1981-90), Peru underwent an extraordinarily adverse macroeconomic 
transformation. For the two 5-year sub-periods 1981-85 and 1985-90, Peru's growth rate was -1.81% and -3.63%. In 
1983, a combination of shocks - world recession, oil price hikes, terms of trade deterioration and rise in global 
interest rates - led to a decline in real GDP per capita of 14%. In 1989, real GDP per capita again declined by 14%. 
Over the entire period 1960-2005, the average growth rate of real GDP for Peru was .89% compared to 1.56% for 
LAC. 
 
Even more striking than growth rates is Peru's inflation record. LAC economies, as a whole, performed 
poorly on the inflationary front. Peru's record, even placed within this context, is extraordinarily poor. Up to the 
mid-70s, inflation in Peru was lower than that of other LAC countries (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2:  Inflation Rates (Peru versus LAC Countries) 
 1961-
1965 
1966-
1970 
1971-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
1961-
2005 
PERU 8.96% 9.79% 12.80% 51.05% 104.93% 2342% 113% .6.91% 1.94% 295% 
LAC 11.57% 21.28% 15.97% 24.03% 17.83% 22.61% 22.21% 6.73% 6.88% 16.57% 
Source:  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
 
Between 1976 and 1995, inflation in Peru was greater than that of other LAC countries by several orders of 
magnitude. During the entire 1961-2005 period, the average inflation rate for LAC economies was 16.57% while 
that of Peru was an extraordinary 295%. In fact, given that Peru is part of the sample for LAC countries, the actual 
discrepancy in inflation between Peru and other LAC countries is even greater than indicated by the numbers above. 
Dornbusch (1988, p.34) points to one major reason why inflation management was so poor by quoting an 
astonishing piece of economic analysis from El Peru Heterodoxo: Un Modelo Economico, a book published by the 
architects of the 1980s economic program.  
 
"An examination of the Peruvian record reveals that periods of moderate inflation are associated with expansionary 
fiscal policies and periods of major inflation are associated with fiscal restraint. Thus, the record shows exactly the 
opposite of what is predicted by a theory which explains inflation by fiscal deficits". 
 
It is hardly surprising that inflationary management in Peru was so dismal given the policymakers‟ lack of 
understanding of basic economics.   
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IS THE HIGH EFFECTIVE COST OF FINANCE A BINDING CONSTRAINT IN PERU? IS LOW 
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT THE PROBLEM? 
 
Traditionally, poor economic growth has been linked to low investment. Perhaps Peru‟s poor 
macroeconomic performance could be linked to the fact that it saves and invests a lower percentage of its GDP as 
compared to other LAC countries. Table 3 computes average annual domestic savings during the period 1990-2005. 
It is clear from Table 3 that Peru‟s average annual savings rate of 18.31% over the last 15 years is better than the 
average LAC country savings rate of 16.68%. Savings in Peru is neither exceptionally good nor bad; Peru‟s savings 
behavior seems about average for LAC countries.  
 
 
Table 3:  Average Annual Savings Growth (1990-2005) 
Country Savings (% of GDP) 
ARG 18.70 
BOL 10.33 
BRA 21.48 
CHL 26.15 
COL 17.54 
CRI 16.97 
DOM 16.19 
ECU 22.46 
SLV 2.10 
GTM 8.13 
GUY 16.39 
HND 19.58 
MEX 20.71 
NIC 0.45 
PAN 26.43 
PRY 10.99 
PER 18.31 
URY 15.01 
VEN 29.00 
LAC Average 16.68 
Source:  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
 
Table 4:  Average Annual Growth in Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation and Per Capita GDP Growth  (1990-2005) 
Country GFCF (as % of GDP) GDP Per Capita Growth 
ARG 17.41 2.30 
BOL 16.06 1.40 
BRA 19.40 0.60 
CHL 23.16 4.11 
COL 17.52 1.22 
CRI 19.08 2.29 
DOM 22.24 2.60 
ECU 19.44 1.12 
SLV 16.44 1.85 
GTM 14.90 1.18 
GUY 29.03 2.83 
HND 24.27 0.52 
MEX 19.25 1.61 
NIC 24.30 0.87 
PAN 18.87 2.96 
PRY 21.36 -0.54 
PER 19.74 1.75 
URY 13.17 1.62 
VEN 20.10 0.61 
LAC Average 19.78 1.63 
Source:  Computed from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
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 Savings need to be translated into productive investments. Table 4 contrasts all LAC countries in terms of 
their gross capital formation (as % of GDP) during the period 1990-2005 and then contrasts it with the annual 
average growth in real per capita GDP growth over the same period. Compared to other LAC countries, Peru‟s 
investment is almost equal to the average for LAC countries. In terms of per capita GDP growth, Peru marginally 
out-performs the LAC average of 1.63%.   
 
The analysis thus far suggests that lack of savings and investment may not constitute the primary 
explanation for Peru‟s poor per capita income growth over the last 15 years. In general, Peru‟s average savings and 
investment behavior for the past 15 years is not out of the ordinary for LAC countries. The fact that savings and 
investment is not the primary constraint in Peru is also suggested by the behavior of the current account deficit and 
interest rates in Peru. Peru‟s trade balance has been experiencing a surplus since 2002, and its current account 
balance nearly broke even in 2004, then experienced a surplus in 2005 (see Figure 1). Though these are fairly recent 
developments, the fact that Peru does not seem to be savings-constrained is highlighted by the behavior of Peru‟s 
deposit rate.  
 
 
Figure 1 
CURRENT & TRADE ACCOUNT BALANCE AS % OF GDP (1990-2005)
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Source:  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
 
Peru‟s deposit rate in 1990 was an astounding 2,440%. Since then, interest rates have been steadily 
declining. In 2005, the deposit interest rate averaged 3.43% (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 
DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE IN PERU
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Source:  Penn World Tables 
 
 
Figure 3 
EMERGING MARKET BOND YIELD SPREADS
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Note:  Data for 2006 pertains to June 2006. 
Source:  Global Financial Stability Report (2006) 
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IS EXTERNAL FINANCE THE PROBLEM IN PERU?  
 
To reinforce the notion that Peru‟s primary constraint is not lack of access to capital, we turn now to look at 
Peru‟s external borrowing situation. In general, Peru‟s external borrowing rates have not been out of the ordinary for 
LAC countries. Figure 3 depicts EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index) global yield spreads for a sample of five 
LAC countries. As of the second quarter of 2006, Peru‟s bonds had a lower yield spread than Brazil, Colombia or 
Venezuela bonds. (It should be noted that as of the second quarter of 2006, Argentina‟s bonds had a yield spread of 
385 basis points while Ecuador‟s bonds had an even worse yield spread of 506 basis points). As with savings and 
investment, Peru‟s bond yield spreads are not out of the ordinary for LAC countries.  
 
A more direct measure than even external bond yield spreads to assess the pressure to finance externally is 
to consider the actual extent of external bond financing. The data for Peru again does not provide any surprises. 
Peru‟s external borrowing over the last half decade has been modest. In 2005, Peru issued external bonds worth U$ 
2157 million. This should be contrasted with Argentina‟s external bond issue of U$ 19,093 million and Brazil‟s 
issue of U$ 17,681. Of the total amount of external bonds issued by all LAC countries, Peru‟s share was about 
3.50%. Argentina and Brazil, with far worse yield spreads than Peru, borrowed considerably more from external 
markets. The data is fairly conclusive that Peru does not seem to be savings-constrained in either domestic or 
external markets. 
 
ARE LOW RETURNS TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY THE PROBLEM IN PERU?  IS GEOGRAPHY AND 
TRANSPORT COSTS A PROBLEM? 
 
The geography of a country can have a major impact on its competitiveness. The costs of conducting trade 
are impacted by transportation costs which in turn are impacted by a country‟s geographical characteristics.  
  
 We consider a number of indicators to assess the influence of Peru‟s geography and infrastructure on its 
competitiveness. Peru is not a landlocked country; in fact, Peru has 2,414 km of coastline. The major economic 
activity in Peru occurs along the coastline and the majority of the population centers are located along the coastline. 
However, there is a large part of the country that is relatively uninhabited with relatively little economic activity 
occurring. Figure 4 looks at a sample of LAC countries and assesses the relationship between their GDP levels and 
proximity to a major port. On average, a given geographical point in Peru is roughly about 4000 km from a major 
port. In this regard, Peru does much better than several other LAC countries, including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay 
and Brazil. Clearly, geographical factors, by themselves, do not seem to be the primary economic constraint in Peru.  
 
Figure 4:  Distance to Closest Major Port 
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Source:  Center for International Development (CID), Harvard University 
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IS INFRASTRUCTURE THE PROBLEM IN PERU? 
 
The geography of a country can have a major impact on its competitiveness. However, a country‟s 
geographical endowment, by itself, need not necessarily constitute a binding constraint. A country can overcome the 
constraints imposed by geography if the quality of a country‟s infrastructure is high. An exhaustive analysis of 
infrastructure, geography, transport costs and trade competitiveness is provided by Limao and Venables (2000) who 
use the CIF/FOB ratio as a proxy for transport costs, insurance and freight. Bonifaz, Gonzalez-Vigil and Urrunaga 
(2002), however, point out that CIF/FOB costs are only an indirect indicator since limitations in geography can be 
surmounted by good infrastructure. Bonifaz et al. argue that the CIF/FOB ratio used by Limao and Venables may 
actually be proxying for infrastructural quality.  
 
“…an improvement in infrastructure is equivalent to a reduction in the geographic distance between countries. On 
the other hand, it is clear that geographic distances are not necessarily the same as economic distances, but depend, 
among other factors, on infrastructure presence, its quality, and its regulation”(Bonifaz, Gonzalez-Vigil and 
Urrunaga, 2002, p.51).    
  
We consider a number of indicators to assess the influence of Peru‟s infrastructure on its competitiveness. 
Table 5 presents results from the Global Competitiveness Report (2005-6) on Railroad, Port and Air Transport 
Efficiency Indicators for a sample of LAC countries.   
 
 
Table 5:  Infrastructure Efficiency Indicators in LAC Countries (2005) 
Country Railroad Infrastructure Port Infrastructure Air Transport Infrastructure 
Argentina 2.7 3.6 4.3 
Bolivia 1.8 1. 3.7 
Brazil 1.8 2.7 4.5 
Colombia 1.4 2.8 4.7 
Costa Rica 1.2 2.3 4.5 
Chile 2.7 4.9 5.7 
Dominican Republic 1.1 3.4 4.8 
Ecuador 1.2 2.9 4.4 
El Salvador 1.5 3.9 5.6 
Mexico 2.2 3.3 4.9 
Paraguay 1.0 2.3 2.9 
Peru 1.6 2.1 3.2 
Uruguay 1.5 4.4 3.5 
Venezuela 1.3 2.8 4.0 
LAC AVERAGE 1.64 3.06 4.34 
Note: 1 = Underdeveloped; 7= Efficient and Extensive as the World‟s Best 
Source:  The Global Competitiveness Report, 2005-2006 
 
 
The results in Table 5 indicate that Peru‟s railroad infrastructure is about average for LAC countries, but its 
port and air transport infrastructural facilities are worse than the other LAC countries represented in the sample. 
Thus, infrastructure could be a potential bottleneck in explaining Peru‟s poor economic performance. 
 
Since infrastructure seems to be a constraint, we examine this aspect further. The 2002 “Investment 
Climate Assessment” (ICA) for Peru, conducted by the World Bank, indicates that poor quality infrastructure is a 
major constraint in Peru. In a 2001 World Bank Survey, logistics costs comprised 28% of business expenses in Peru, 
while logistical costs in Chile comprised only 15% of costs. Similarly, a study conducted by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) on the quality of road infrastructure in LAC countries ranks Peru as second only to 
Bolivia in terms of poor road infrastructure (see Figure 5). The Investment Climate Assessment Survey also notes 
that only 13% of the roads in Peru are paved and transport time can vary greatly.   
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Figure 5 
Ranking of Road Infrastructure in Latin America
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Source:  Infrastructure Report, Inter-American Development Bank, Mimeo 2000 
 
Figure 6 
Transport Costs to Export Textiles to the US Compared to Taiwan 
(Numbers in Parenthesis are average maritime distances to the US)
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The link between poor infrastructure, high transport costs and the resulting lack of competitiveness in 
international markets is highlighted in a study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation on the cost of 
exporting textiles to the U.S. (as compared to Taiwan). Figure 6 shows that Peru‟s major port of Callao has higher 
transport costs than other ports worldwide, even though Peru is far closer than the other markets in the sample.  For 
instance, both Uruguay and Thailand are almost twice as far from the U.S. as Peru, but yet they have a cost 
advantage of 31% and 23% as compared to Peru‟s cost disadvantage of 29%. The study is a stark reminder that 
Peru‟s infrastructure, far more than its geography, is a primary constraint on its competitiveness. Peru‟s ability to 
import and export efficiently is adversely affected by the bottlenecks in its infrastructure. 
 
The analysis above indicates that infrastructure and transport costs are clearly a problem in Peru. 
Moreover, in relation to other LAC countries, Peru has been investing a relatively small percentage of its GDP in 
infrastructural improvements. At the end of the 1990s, Chile was investing 2% of its GDP in infrastructure 
improvements, while Ecuador and Brazil invested 1% of their GDP in infrastructural development. The equivalent 
figure in Peru was 0.20%.
2
 Thus, not only is the quality of Peru‟s infrastructure poor; it seems likely that the quality 
gap between Peru and other LAC countries will widen even further in the future.    
 
IS POOR HUMAN CAPITAL THE PROBLEM IN PERU? 
 
The relationship between education and human capital and between human capital and income growth are 
well documented in the development economics literature. Among the best known studies in this area are papers by 
Barro (1991), IADB (1993), and Barro and Salai-Martin (1995).  
 
Generally speaking, the labor force in LAC countries has lower educational attainment than in countries of 
similar income levels. The average schooling of a work force participant in OECD countries is 11.1 years. In East 
Asia (excluding China) average schooling is 8.1 years, while the average in LAC countries is only 5.4 years.  Figure 
7 considers the years of schooling for populations over 25 years of age for all LAC countries. (It should be noted 
that the data here pertains to population over age 25 and therefore includes a sample of participants who have retired 
from the workforce. However, it is a reasonable proxy of the educational attainment of the specific country‟s labor 
force).    
 
Figure 7 
YEARS OF SCHOOLING FOR POP. OVER 25 YEARS OF AGE
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Source: ECLAC 
                                                   
2 “Peru Investment Climate Assessment, ”  International Financial Corporation (IFC), 2002.  pp. 40.   
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Human capital, as represented by years of schooling, does not seem to be an issue in Peru. Given the LAC 
country‟s average of 5.9 years, Peru‟s average of about 7 years of schooling places its work force among the better 
educated work forces in Latin America.  
 
However, years of schooling of the labor force alone does not indicate if human capital constitutes a growth 
bottleneck. Rates of return on human capital are a better indicator of the role played by human capital in a country‟s 
economic development. In contrast to many of the previous indicators, the picture in Peru is unambiguous. The table 
below reports estimated Mincerian Rates of Return on Human Capital
3
 from a variety of different studies for a 
sample of LAC countries. The Mincerian rates are complied from various country household surveys using the most 
recent estimates available.  
 
 
Table 6:  Mincerian Returns to Higher Education by Different Levels (Social vs. Private) 
Country Social Returns Private Returns 
Argentina 7.6 14.9 
Bolivia 13 19 
Brazil 21.4 28.2 
Colombia 14 21.7 
Costa Rica 9.0 12.9 
Chile 14 20.7 
Ecuador 9.9 12.7 
El Salvador 8.0 9.5 
Mexico 11.1 15.7 
Paraguay 10.8 13.7 
Peru - 40.0 
Uruguay 10.3 12.8 
Venezuela 6.2 11.0 
Source: Ed Stats of the World Bank 
 
 
What is immediately obvious is that the return to private education in Peru is almost twice as much as the 
LAC average and more than one-third higher than even it‟s closest competitor, Brazil. Clearly, the return to private 
education in Peru could not be so high if higher education was not a bottleneck. The excess returns to higher 
education are a symptom of a country that is constrained by lack of access to high quality human capital. Our 
analysis then seems to indicate that access to human capital seems to be a significant constraint to economic growth 
in Peru.    
 
ARE MACRO AND MICRO RISKS THE PROBLEM IN PERU?  IS APPROPRIABILITY A PROBLEM? 
 
Macroeconomic risk arises from volatility, which is primarily related to inflation. LAC economies, as a 
whole, performed poorly on the inflationary front. Peru's record, even placed within this context, is extraordinarily 
poor. Up to the mid-70s, inflation in Peru was lower than that of other LAC countries.  Between 1976 and 1995, 
however, inflation in Peru was greater than that of other LAC countries by several orders of magnitude. Over the 
entire 1961-2005 period, the average inflation rate for LAC economies was 16.57%, while that of Peru was an 
extraordinary 295%.  
 
However, there has been a remarkable turnaround in the last few years. During the period 2001-2005, the 
average inflation rate in Peru was 1.94% compared to 6.88% for LAC countries. Clearly, over the last five years, 
there has been somewhat of a turnaround in Peru's macroeconomic performance. Therefore, while inflation was 
clearly a problem in the past, it currently does not seem to be much of an issue.  
 
                                                   
3 See Mincer, J. (1974), Schooling, Experience and Earnings, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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 Much like inflation rates, the exchange rate in Peru has also come into control within the past few years 
after extreme volatility in the early 1990s. Due to high inflation and interest rates, the domestic currency was worth 
very little relative to the U.S. Dollar.  However, after an extreme devaluation, the real exchange rate has stabilized.  
 
 Even though the macro environment, with regard to inflation and exchange rates, has stabilized within the 
last few years, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty with respect to government laws, regulations and 
economic policies. There is little doubt that the microeconomic business climate in Peru constitutes a major 
bottleneck to Peru's development. Survey upon survey highlights the uncertain investment and business climate in 
Peru. Table 7 below compares corporate and personal tax rates, customs duties, tax revenues and business profit 
taxes for a sample of Latin American countries. Though Peru is not the worst among LAC countries, there are 
clearly issues of appropriability in Peru.   
 
 
Table 7:  Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Peru 
Country Name Corporate Rate Personal Rate Customs Duties Tax Revenue Business Profit Tax 
Argentina 35 35 4.94 14.21 97.90 
Bolivia 25 13 5.05 15.12 64.00 
Brazil 15 27.5 5.93 12.15 147.90 
Chile 16.5 40 2.85 15.74 46.70 
Colombia 36.7 35 6.51 13.94 75.10 
Costa Rica 30 30 6.26 13.44 54.30 
Dominican Republic 25 25 16.18 14.67 57.20 
Ecuador 25 25 .. .. 33.90 
El Salvador 25 30 10.04 10.98 32.20 
Mexico 33 33 5.13 .. 31.30 
Nicaragua 25 25 6.08 15.70 54.30 
Panama 30 30 23.67 .. 32.90 
Paraguay 30 .. 18.34 11.19 37.90 
Peru 30 30 7.70 13.29 50.70 
Uruguay 35 .. 7.07 18.48 80.20 
Venezuela, RB 34 34 7.35 11.54 48.90 
Source: ECLAC 
 
 
Peru's recent political history has also been unfortunately violent, marred by the active operation of 
extremist, terrorist organizations like Sendero Luminoso, Sendero Rojo and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
movement. The turmoil in Peru has lead to a situation in which property rights are not effectively protected and the 
rule of law is weak. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that: 
 
"......the judicial system is often extremely slow to hear cases and to issue decisions....allegations of corruption and 
outside interference in the judicial system are common....investors have found that contracts are often difficult to 
enforce in Peru".  
 
To measure the quality of Peru's institutions, we use the Index of Economic Freedom - an index developed 
jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, which is perhaps the most comprehensive index of 
economic freedom currently available. The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) is created from a numerical ranking 
based on a comprehensive list of 10 institutional factors. The numerical rankings for each institutional factor could 
fall into either of four broad categories:   
 
Free:    A score of 1.99 or less 
Mostly Free:   A score of 2 to 2.99 
Mostly Unfree:  A score of 3 to 3.99 
Repressed:  A score of 4 or higher 
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Thus, lower scores indicate greater freedom. (By this measure, Hong-Kong was the freest country in the 
world, while North Korea was the most repressed.)  The institutional factors measured by the EFI, the variables that 
go into measuring each institutional factor, as well as the score received by Peru in each category, are shown in 
Table 8.  
 
 
Table 8:  Economic Freedom Index (2005) Values for Peru 
Institutional Factor Variables Included in Computing Institutional Factor Score Peru's Score 
Trade Policy Index Weighted Average Tariff Rates, Non-Tariff Barriers, Corruption 
in Customs, etc 
4.0 
Fiscal Burden of Government Index Personal Tax Rates, Corporate Tax Rates, Ratio of Govt. 
Expenditure to GDP, etc. 
2.50 
Govt. Intervention Index Govt. Consumption as % of GDP, Govt. Ownership, etc. 2.0 
Monetary Policy Index Weighted Average Inflation Rates over a 10 year period 1.0 
Capital Flow & Investment Index Investment Code, Foreign Ownership Restrictions, Capital 
Restrictions, etc. 
2.0 
Banking and Finance Index Govt. Ownership of Financial Institutions, Foreign Ownership 
Restrictions, Govt. Regulations that inhibit financial activity, etc. 
2.0 
Wage and Price Index Minimum Wage Laws, Price Ceilings, Price Controls, Govt. 
Subsidies, etc. 
2.0 
Property Rights Index Commercial Code, Expropriation, Govt. Influence of Judiciary, 
Corruption, etc. 
4.0 
Regulation Index Licensing Requirements, Bureaucratic Corruption, Labor Laws, 
Environmental and Consumer Protections, etc. 
4.0 
Informal Market Index Extent of Smuggling, Black Market Activities, Intellectual 
Property Rights, etc. 
4.0 
  Composite EFI 
Score = 2.75 
 
 
From Table 8, it is clear that even though Peru has done relatively well in terms of the indices relating to 
monetary policy, capital flows, banking/finance and wages/prices, it scores poorly for the institutional quality of 
property rights enforcement, trade restrictions, regulatory environment and the extent of black market activities.  
 
A recent World Bank study ("Microeconomic Constraints to Growth", June 15, 2004) utilizes a unique data 
set on manufacturing firms to come to the conclusion that both the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
environment in Peru constitutes a serious constraint to growth in Peru.  
 
The report goes on to quantify the real impact of such macroeconomic uncertainty. It calculates, for 
instance, that for each one point rise in uncertainty (on a 5-point scale), investment in machinery dropped by an 
astounding 16% and business profitability by 2%.  Thus, there is little doubt that an uncertain macroeconomic and 
microeconomic environment constitutes a serious constraint on Peru's growth.  
 
From the discussion above it seems reasonable to conclude that the macro and microeconomic environment 
in Peru constitutes a binding constraint and relieving this constraint would lead to significant economic growth in 
Peru.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
1. Peru is not savings or investment constrained in either domestic or international markets.  This is indicated 
by the fact that domestic interest rates and external bond yield spreads are relatively low. 
2. Peru is constrained with regard to high quality human capital. Peru has among the lowest retention rates in 
Latin America for scientists and engineers. The fact that Peru is constrained in terms of human capital is 
signaled by the very high Mincerian rates of return to human capital. 
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3. The sophistication of Peru‟s exports is not a constraint. In fact, Peru seems to have done well in terms of 
self-discovery.  
4. Poor infrastructure in Peru is a constraint. The infrastructural constraints result in very high transport costs 
which adversely impact its competitiveness.  
5. The micro and macroeconomic environment in Peru is perhaps the most binding constraint of all. Survey 
after survey reveals this aspect. A recent World Bank study and a survey by the World Economic Forum 
confirm our findings.  
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